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ABSTRACT. Fifty years ago, Clarence Earl Gideon needed an effective trial attorney. The
Supreme Court agreed with Gideon that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed him the right to
counsel at trial. Recently, Galin Frye and Anthony Cooper also needed effective representation.
These two men, unlike Gideon, wanted to plead guilty and thus needed effective plea
bargaining counsel. However, their attorneys failed to represent them effectively, and the
Supreme Court -recognizing the reality that ninety-five percent of all convictions follow guilty
pleas and not trials -ruled in favor of Frye and Cooper.
If negotiation is a critical stage in a system that consists almost entirely of bargaining, is
there a constitutional right to the effective assistance of plea bargaining counsel? If so, is it
possible to define the contours of such a right? The concept of a right to an effective bargainer
seems radical, yet obvious; fraught with difficulties, yet in urgent need of greater attention.
In this Essay, I argue that the Court's broad statements in Missouri v. Frye, Lafler v. Cooper,
and its 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky about the critical role defense counsel plays in plea
negotiations strongly support a right to effective plea bargaining counsel. Any right to effective
bargaining should be judged-as other ineffective assistance claims are judged-by counsel's
success or failure in following prevailing professional norms. This Essay discusses the numerous
professional standards that support the notion that defense counsel should act effectively when
the prosecution seeks to negotiate and should initiate negotiations when the prosecution fails to
do so, if it serves the client's goals.
The objections to constitutional regulation of plea bargaining include the claims that
negotiation is a nuanced art conducted behind closed doors that is difficult to capture in
standards and that regulating bargaining will open floodgates to future litigation. While real,
these are manageable challenges that do not outweigh the need to give meaning to the
constitutional right to effective counsel. After all, in a criminal justice system that is largely
composed of plea bargains, what is effective assistance of counsel if it does not encompass
effectiveness within the plea negotiation process?
A U T H 0 R. Professor of Law and Co-Director, Criminal Justice Clinic, American University,
Washington College of Law. With thanks to Stephanos Bibas, Josh Bowers, Mary Holland,
Cecelia Klingele, Juliet Stumpf, Andrew Taslitz, Ronald Wright, and participants in the
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INTRODUCTION
Charged with a felony in Florida state court, Clarence Earl Gideon needed a
lawyer but could not afford one. Although the trial judge sympathized, he
believed state law barred him from granting Gideon's request for appointed
counsel.' At his original trial in 1961,2 "Gideon conducted his defense about as
well as could be expected from a layman," yet the jury convicted and the judge
sentenced him to five years in prison.' Pursuing his claim of a Sixth
Amendment right to appointed counsel up to the Supreme Court, Gideon
triumphed: on remand, he got his trial with a defense lawyer who played a
critical role.4 This time, the jury acquitted after deliberating for a little more
than an hour.s
More than forty years later in different state courts, Galin Frye and
Anthony Cooper did not want trials, but like Gideon, they needed effective
representation. They wanted to plead guilty and to cut their losses by getting
the most favorable sentences possible. Both men had lawyers who failed to
serve them in this regard. Frye's attorney neglected to tell him about a
favorable misdemeanor plea offer in his felony case, and Cooper's attorney
talked him out of accepting a favorable plea offer by giving him bad advice
about his chances at trial.6
Gideon needed representation at trial. The Gideon decision recognized how
"[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law," and thus "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him."' Frye and Cooper needed lawyers focused
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337 (1963) ("The COURT: Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but
I cannot appoint Counsel to represent you in this case. Under the laws of the State of
Florida, the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that
person is charged with a capital offense. I am sorry, but I will have to deny your request to
appoint Counsel to defend you in this case." (quoting a colloquy from Gideon's trial)).
2. ANTHONY LEWIs, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 9 (1964).
3. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337 ("[Gideon] made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined
the State's witnesses, presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify himself,
and made a short argument 'emphasizing his innocence to the charge."').
4. Id. at 344.
s. LEWIS, supra note 2, at 237.
6. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012).
7. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932)). Gideon
established indigent defendants' right to appointed counsel in a state proceeding; the Court
later set out the two-pronged test for analyzing the adequacy of that representation. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that in ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, the defendant must show that, first, counsel's representation was
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on a different task: counsel who functioned effectively in a plea bargaining
system. In three recent decisions, the Court signaled a new era in the
constitutional regulation of plea bargaining.' Padilla v. Kentucky established
that defendants in criminal cases have a constitutional right to counsel's advice
about the deportation consequences of a conviction.' In Missouri v. Frye, the
Court held that Frye's attorney acted incompetently when he failed to
communicate to Frye a plea offer from the prosecution.o Lafler v. Cooper held
that defendants who reject a lenient plea offer and go to trial due to counsel's
bad advice, with the result of a harsher sentence, have a potential remedy.n
The case holdings thus all relate to an individual's right to information and
counseling about a plea offer or guilty plea. They do not examine -and so do
not directly establish-a defendant's right to a lawyer who meets minimal
constitutional standards for "effective" plea bargaining between the defense
attorney and the prosecutor. They regulate only the conversation between
defense counsel and the client. For example, Padilla established the right to
advice about the deportation consequences of a conviction, but did not
establish the right to a lawyer who does an effective job avoiding deportation
when feasible.
Yet it is difficult to conceive of a meaningful right to counsel if counsel is
not required to function effectively in a plea bargaining system. This is
precisely Jose Padilla's current situation, having won his ineffective assistance
claim." Back in the trial court on the original charges, Padilla's options are
clear: he can go to trial or he can negotiate a plea bargain that avoids
incompetent as judged by prevailing professional norms; and, second, this incompetence
prejudiced the defendant); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (applying the Strickland
test to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the guilty plea context); see also McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ("It has long been recognized that the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.").
8. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer
Protection, 99 CALF. L. REv. 1117 (2011) (discussing plea bargaining regulation in wake of
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)).
g. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
io. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408.
ii. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391. In Lafler, the government conceded that defense counsel failed to
competently advise the defendant about the wisdom of proceeding to trial and rejecting a
lenient plea offer. Id. at 1386. Had the Court examined this issue, it would have been a
significant analysis of the contours and content of counsel's constitutional duty to advise the
client, building on the Court's nascent jurisprudence of client counseling in Padilla.
12. Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W. 3 d 322, 330 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).
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deportation. 3 For example, a carefully structured plea to felony solicitation
under Kentucky state law" might allow Padilla to avoid deportation in his
California immigration case.s Although the Supreme Court did not consider
whether trial counsel should have explored such a plea initially, the issue is
now squarely presented for Padilla's lawyer. It is hard to imagine any strategic
reason that counsel would now fail to seek a plea that might avoid deportation
(unless perhaps Padilla instructed counsel that he only wanted a trial). Indeed,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals on remand recognized that, "had the
immigration consequences of Padilla's plea been factored into the plea
bargaining process, trial counsel may have obtained a plea agreement that
would not have the consequence of mandatory deportation."" Defense
counsel's duty to effectively bargain is thus clearly illustrated in instances
where defense counsel failed to attempt to bargain around severe collateral
consequences that the defendant wished to avoid. Such bargaining is central to
counsel's core function, because even the most minor conviction can lead to
severe collateral consequences affecting basic facets of daily life such as
housing, public benefits, and employment; criminal records are also widely
available through a variety of easily accessible databases, so that every contact
with the criminal justice system affects individuals' lives in ways unimaginable
only a decade ago."
13. The government could decline to reprosecute Padilla on remand, although this seems
unlikely.
14. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.030 (LexisNexis 2008) (defining criminal solicitation).
is. See Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that solicitation is
not a deportable offense under a section of the immigration laws stating that any noncitizen
"convicted of ... any law or regulation . . . relating to a controlled substance . . . may be
deported" (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1994)); see also DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D.
ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW & CRIMES § 7:36 n.3 (noting that Coronado-Durazo's
solicitation holding should also apply to deportations based on an aggravated felony).
Kentucky does not have a misprision felony, which would have been a strong candidate for a
plea bargain if all parties agreed that avoiding Padilla's deportation was desirable. See
Castaneda De Esper v. INS, 557 F.2d 79, 8o (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that a conviction for
federal felony of misprision of a conspiracy to possess heroin is not a conviction relating to
possession or traffic in narcotic drugs under the former deportation statute). Had Padilla
been charged in federal court, he might have avoided deportation if the federal prosecutor
had offered a plea to misprision or accessory after the fact. See Representing Noncitizen
Criminal Defendants: A National Guide, DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS PARTNERSHIP § 4.4 (Apr.
2012), http://www.probono.net/library/attachment.1324o8.
16. Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d at 330.
17. See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & CECELIA KLINGELE, COLLATERAL
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Imagine a jurisdiction where prosecutors regularly negotiate to reduce
felony drug possession charges to misdemeanors with nonjail treatment
alternatives or probation for first-time offenders. Imagine defense counsel with
limited experience in this jurisdiction with a client whose primary concern is
avoiding incarceration. Based on this concern, on an official sentencing range
for the felony charge extending from probation to years of imprisonment, and
on a lack of strong suppression arguments or trial defenses, counsel tells the
prosecution the defendant will plead guilty to the felony in exchange for a
sentence of probation. The prosecutor agrees, having been ready to accept a
misdemeanor plea if asked and having had no intention of seeking jail or
prison time in any event. The defendant pleads guilty to the drug felony and is
sentenced to probation. Despite the oversimplified facts, one may question
whether counsel functioned effectively in the plea bargain system or instead
whether counsel saddled the defendant with an unnecessary felony conviction,
with all the direct and collateral consequences that follow such a conviction, by
failing to take the simple and well-established step of asking for a
misdemeanor offer.
The Court's recent plea bargaining jurisprudence "made clear that
'negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel."',,8 The cases are also
testament to the Court's recognition that "plea bargaining is . . . not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system,"' 9 and to
the reality that ninety-five percent of all convictions follow guilty pleas and not
trials.2 o If negotiation is a critical stage in a system that consists almost entirely
of bargaining, is there a constitutional right to the effective assistance of plea
bargaining counsel? If so, is it possible to define the contours of such a right,
even broadly? The concept of a right to an effective bargainer seems radical, yet
obvious; fraught with difficulties, yet in urgent need of greater attention. After
exploring the jurisprudential support for a right to effective bargaining counsel
18. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 14o6 (2012) (emphasis added) (citing Padilla v. Kentucky,
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2oo)).
ig. Id. at 1407 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, toi
YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). By exploring the contours and meaning of the right to effective
plea counsel in this Essay, I do not mean to approve of a criminal justice system that is a
plea-mill system. Indeed, elsewhere I have recently proposed "crashing" the misdemeanor
system by offering defendants zealous representation for petty offenses in the lower courts,
in the hopes that this would lead to fewer guilty pleas, more trials, and thus pressure on the
system so it could no longer tolerate the mass misdemeanor prosecution approach that is so
harmful to individuals and society. Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1089 (2013).
2o. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.
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in the Court's recent plea bargaining decisions, Part I describes several
professional standards relating to plea negotiations in order to demonstrate
that this area of criminal defense practice has detailed standards that can
inform the developing constitutional norms. Part II considers two main
obstacles to an attempt to regulate ineffective bargaining counsel as a
constitutional matter, namely the arguments that negotiation is an art
conducted behind closed doors that is nuanced and difficult to capture in
standards and that attempting to regulate bargaining will open floodgates to
future litigation. This Part concludes that while constitutional analysis and
regulation of the content of plea bargaining poses challenges, these challenges
do not outweigh the need to give meaning to the constitutional right to
effective bargaining counsel.
I. REGULATING THE PLEA PROCESS IN PADILLA, FRYE, AND LAFLER
In Padilla, Frye, and Lafler, the Supreme Court established a significant
body of plea bargaining and guilty-plea jurisprudence grounded in the Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. This Part tells the
stories of deficient plea processes in those cases, and then discusses the
jurisprudential support they provide for a constitutional right to effective
bargaining.
A. The Cases ofJose Padilla, Galin Frye, and Anthony Cooper
Jose Padilla, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was arrested
with a large amount of marijuana in his commercial truck." Although he had
children who were U.S. citizens," had served in the Army during Vietnam,"
and had made only one two-week journey back to his birth country of
Honduras during the forty years preceding his arrest,' Padilla faced automatic
deportation for a felony marijuana trafficking conviction because he was a
noncitizen.2 s Unfortunately Padilla did not know this, and pled guilty after his
21. joint Appendix at 79-80, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. o8-651), 2009 WL 1499270, at *51.
22. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 29, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. o8-651), 2009 WL 2917817, at
* 13.
23. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477.
24. Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W. 3d 322, 324 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).
25. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 & n.i.
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trial attorney gave him the patently incorrect advice that he "did not have to
worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long."26
In 2010, the Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky held that criminal
defense attorneys have an affirmative constitutional duty to properly advise
clients about the near-automatic deportation consequences of a guilty plea. 7
Padilla thus met the first part of the two-pronged test for a Sixth Amendment
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: a demonstration that counsel's acts or
omissions were unreasonable under prevailing professional norms." The
Court remanded for the state court to determine whether Padilla could
demonstrate prejudice and thus meet the second prong. 9
Recently, Padilla made that showing. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
recognized that its task on remand was to analyze prejudice by "determin[ing]
whether the defendant's rejection of the plea offer would have been a rational
choice, even if not the best choice," and by doing so in the context of "the
importance a particular defendant places upon preserving his or her right to
remain in this country."3 o The "bargain" Padilla had accepted was dismissal of
the charge of failing to have a tax number on his truck if he pled guilty to all
other charges with a prosecutorial recommendation of the maximum possible
26. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W. 3 d 482, 483(Ky. 2oo8)). Under federal immigration law, any conviction "relating to a controlled
substance ... other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams
or less of marijuana" makes an individual deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006); see
also id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) ("Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time
after admission is deportable."); id. § nlo(a)(43)(B) (defining "aggravated felony" to mean
"illicit trafficking in a controlled substance . . . , including a drug trafficking crime"); 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2006) ("For purposes of this subsection, the term 'drug trafficking
crime' means any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act . . . , the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act . . . , or chapter 705 of tide 46.").
27. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. When "the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct,
clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence," such as in Padilla, defense counsel
can easily determine that deportation is "presumptively mandatory" and must so counsel the
client. Id. at 1483. "When the law is not succinct and straightforward. . . , a criminal defense
attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences." Id.
28. Id.; see also supra note 7 (discussing the ineffective assistance test first set out in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
29. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487.
3o. Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W- 3d 3 22, 329 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).
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sentence of ten years, with five to be served and five probated." The court
vacated Padilla's conviction, and remanded his case to the trial court."
Two years later, the Supreme Court returned to constitutional plea
regulation. Galin Frye faced felony charges of driving with a revoked license,
with a four-year prison maximum. The prosecution sent Frye's lawyer a plea
offer letter with two options: a misdemeanor with a recommendation of ninety
days in jail (and a statutory maximum of one year), or the charged felony with
a recommendation of ten days in jail followed by probation." The offer was
open until shortly before Frye's next court date; Frye presumably would have
entered the plea at that court date. However, counsel never told Frye about the
offer, and it expired. Just before his court appearance, Frye was rearrested for
the same offense. Frye eventually pled guilty to felony driving with a revoked
license, still unaware of the earlier plea offer; the judge sentenced him to three
years in prison." In Missouri v. Frye, the Supreme Court held that counsel's
failure to communicate the prosecution's formal plea offer violated the Sixth
Amendment duty to provide reasonably competent assistance of counsel.s The
Court remanded to the Missouri state court for a prejudice determination.
In a case decided the same day, the Supreme Court focused on the proper
remedy when incompetent plea advice leads a defendant to reject a favorable
offer. 7 Anthony Cooper was charged with, among other things, assault with
intent to murder. The prosecution initially offered Cooper fifty-one to eighty-
five months in prison and dismissal of some of the charges."8 Cooper told the
31. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. o8-651), 2oo9 WL
1497552, at *9 (listing the charges).
32. Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3 d at 330-31.
33. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012).
34. Id. at 1404-05.
3S. Id. at 1408.
36. The Supreme Court held that Frye met the first part of the prejudice inquiry by
demonstrating "a reasonable probability [he] would have accepted the prosecutor's original
offer of a plea bargain if the offer had been communicated to him," since he did in fact plead
guilty to a felony while unaware of the misdemeanor offer. Id. at 1411. But Frye also had to
demonstrate a reasonable probability that "the plea would have been entered without the
prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing to accept it." Id. at 1409. The Court noted
Frye's new arrest after the original plea offer in cautioning that "there is strong reason to
doubt the prosecution and the trial court would have permitted the plea bargain to become
final." Id. at 1411. However, because the prosecutor's ability to withdraw and the trial court's
ability to refuse a plea offer is governed by state law, the Court remanded this part of the
prejudice inquiry. Id.
37. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
38. Id. at 1383.
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court he was guilty and "expressed a willingness to accept the offer," but
ultimately rejected it "after his attorney convinced him that the prosecution
would be unable to establish his intent to murder because [the victim] had
been shot below the waist."" During the trial, Cooper rejected another offer;
he was then convicted (despite where the bullet had lodged, which of course
was not a defense at all) and was sentenced to 185 to 360 months'
imprisonment. 40 The government conceded defense counsel's incompetence,
and in Lafler v. Cooper the Supreme Court held that Cooper demonstrated
prejudice because "but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable
probability [Cooper] and the trial court would have accepted the guilty plea,"
and because going to trial led to a "minimum sentence 32 times greater than
he would have received under the plea."" As for the appropriate remedy, the
Court ordered the prosecution to re-extend the original offer, with the large
and bizarre caveat that the trial judge on remand had broad discretion to accept
that offer in whole or in part, or to reject it entirely and "leave the convictions
and sentence from trial undisturbed." 4
While the holdings in Padilla, Frye, and Lafler are relatively narrow, in each
case the Court analyzed the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the
larger context of a criminal justice system that is a plea bargaining system. It is
also a system with potentially heavy penal sanctions and myriad severe
"collateral" consequences.4 1 In such a system, it is hard to conceive of a role for
counsel that does not include effective negotiation. It may be difficult to
regulate the complex and nonpublic arena of actual plea negotiations,4 but




41. Id. at 1391.
42. Id. As Justice Scalia noted, "the remedy the Court announces - namely, whatever the state
trial court in its discretion prescribes, down to and including no remedy at all -is unheard-
of and quite absurd for [a] violation of a constitutional right." Id. at 1392 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
43. See LovE ET AL., supra note 17.
44. See infra Part II.
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B. Jurisprudential Support for a Right to Effective Bargaining Counsel
Despite its well-deserved description as "seismic," 4s "a landmark
interpretation . . . [that] is long overdue,"46 and "the case that many believed
Gideon was meant to be,"" Padilla was not the first time the Supreme Court
regulated plea bargaining and the guilty plea process. In its first forays in the
area, the Court focused on due process considerations, in holdings that largely
related to what the prosecution and trial judge must or cannot do. Thus, in the
1970s the Court applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine the
voluntariness of a guilty plea in one case,48 and invalidated a bargained-for
sentence where the prosecution breached its promises with respect to that
bargain in another." Several years later, as guilty plea statistics continued to
rise,so the Court sounded an accepting note about the "'give-and-take' of plea
bargaining" in finding no due process violation where the prosecutor carried
out a threat made during plea negotiations to reindict the defendant on more
serious charges if he did not plead guilty to the original charges.s"
In 1985, the Court first applied the Sixth Amendment's test for ineffective
assistance of counsel to guilty pleas, bringing defense counsel's behavior
squarely into the law of pleas.s2 However, it was not until Padilla v. Kentucky
45. McGregor Smyth, From "Collateral" to "Integral": The Seismic Evolution ofPadilla v. Kentucky
and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 How. L.J. 795 (2011).
46. Bibas, supra note 8, at 1118-19.
47. Steven Zeidman, Padilla v. Kentucky: Sound and Fury, or Transformative Impact, 39
FORDHAM U1u. L.J. 203, 225 (2011).
48. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970); see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
(1969) (holding that because guilty pleas involve waiver of constitutional rights, the trial
court record must establish voluntariness of plea).
49. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
50. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 5 STAN. L. REV.
1409, 1415 (2003) ("The proportion of guilty pleas has been moving steadily upward for over
thirty years, and has seen a dramatic increase of over eleven percentage points just in the
past ten years, from 85.4% in 1991 [in federal courts].").
51. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 365 (1978). Josh Bowers aptly described the
Court's early plea jurisprudence as "invok[ing] a particular fairness principle -the notion of
unfair surprise-to determine the constitutionality of a guilty-plea conviction." Josh
Bowers, Fundamental Fairness and the Path from Santobello to Padilla: A Response to
Professor Bibas, 2 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 52, 54 (2011), http://www.californialawreview.org
/articles/fundamental-fairness-and-the-path-from-santobello-to-padilla-a-response-to-professor
-bibas. Bowers sees Padilla as similarly concerned with unfair surprise to defendants, and
thus consistent with these earlier cases. Id.
52. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 53 (1985) (declining to rule on Hill's claim that counsel's bad
advice about the parole eligibility consequences of his guilty plea violated constitutional
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that the Court began to regulate the content of defense counsel's conduct in the
plea process." Although Padilla concerns defense attorneys counseling clients
about the deportation consequences of conviction, the decision supports the
idea of a constitutional right to effective bargaining. First, the Court noted that
it has "long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase
of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel."" This statement is significant in light of the rule that the right to
counsel applies to any "critical stage" of a prosecution. 5 To take Padilla at its
word, the negotiation of a plea bargain, at least when undertaken, is something
that must be carried out in a manner that meets effective assistance norms. In a
criminal justice system dominated by plea bargaining, this can also be
interpreted to mean that defense counsel may be required to actively pursue the
client's goals through effective negotiation,s' rather than to wait passively for
offers from the prosecution.
Second, picking up on earlier decisions' theme of bargaining's "mutuality
of advantage,"" Padilla noted that counsel
may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to
craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of
deportation, as by avoiding a conviction for an offense that
automatically triggers the removal consequence. At the same time, the
threat of deportation may provide the defendant with a powerful
incentive to plead guilty to an offense that does not mandate that
penalty in exchange for a dismissal of a charge that does."
competence norms, instead holding that Hill failed to demonstrate prejudice from that
alleged incompetence); see also supra note 7 (describing Strickland's two-pronged ineffective
assistance test).
s. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
54. Id. at 1486.
5s. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
56. See Commonwealth v. Marinho, 464 Mass. 115, 127 (2013) (holding deficient counsel's
failure to "explore all alternatives to trial, including the possible resolution of the case
through a negotiated plea or admission to sufficient facts" (quoting Assigned Counsel
Manual: Policies and Procedures, Chapter 4, CoMmirrEE FOR PUB. COUNSEL SERVS. 46 (June
17, 2011), http://www.publiccounsel.net/private-counsel-manual/CURRENTMANUAL
2012/MANUALChap4CriminalStandards.pdf [hereinafter Assigned Counsel Manual])).
57. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
752 (1970).
s8. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486.
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While this discussion appears to be aimed at practical considerations rather
than constitutional norms, if creative bargaining to avoid deportation-or to
get a lower sentence, or a deferred prosecution-is the professional standard,
then it is necessarily part of the constitutional conversation about plea
bargaining.s"
Frye and Lafler support the concept of a Sixth Amendment duty of
competent bargaining robustly, if indirectly. While the holdings in both cases
are relatively narrow,o the Court more broadly analyzed defense counsel's
duty of competence during the plea bargaining and counseling processes and
considered how to determine prejudice following counsel's incompetency in
fulfilling those duties. Thus, Lafler stated that "[d]efendants have a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, a right that extends to the plea-bargaining
process," and that "[d]uring plea negotiations defendants are 'entitled to the
effective assistance of competent counsel.', 6 Similarly, Frye noted that Padilla
"made clear that 'the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel.'",6 , Surely, if the Court meant to limit the right to effective assistance
to informing and counseling defendants about formal plea offers the
prosecution has extended, it would not have repeatedly used the words "plea
bargaining," "plea negotiations," and "negotiation of a plea bargain." Indeed,
the dissenting Justices in Frye and Lafler criticized the Court for the sweeping
nature of its entry into plea regulation."
The majority could have drawn a constitutional line between the defense
counsel-client conversation and the defense counsel-prosecutor conversation,
59. See id. at 1482 ("The first prong- constitutional deficiency-is necessarily linked to the
practice and expectations of the legal community: 'The proper measure of attorney
performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms."'
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984))); see also infra Part I.C
(discussing professional standards for plea bargaining).
6o. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) ("[D]efense counsel has the duty to
communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions
that may be favorable to the accused."); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) ("The
question for this Court is how to apply Strickland's prejudice test where ineffective
assistance results in a rejection of the plea offer and the defendant is convicted at the ensuing
trial.").
61. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
62. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 14o6 (emphasis added) (citing Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486).
63. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court today opens a whole new
field of constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law."); Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1413
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that this case "present[s] the necessity of confronting the
serious difficulties that will be created by constitutionalization of the plea-bargaining
process. It will not do simply to announce that they will be solved in the sweet by-and-by.").
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declining to regulate the latter. Instead, the Court's recent plea jurisprudence is
firmly grounded in the "reality" of the central role plea bargaining plays in the
criminal justice system. Frye thus made the uncontroversial but important
statement that "[i]n today's criminal justice system . . . the negotiation of a
plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical
point for a defendant."6' The result of this reality is "that defense counsel have
responsibilities in the plea bargain process . . . that must be met to render the
adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires."s6
Both Frye and Lafler recognized the right to a remedy when counsel's
deficient behavior during the plea process "caused nonacceptance of a plea offer
and further proceedings led to a less favorable outcome."6 6 Applying this
concept to deportation consequences, an individual might claim that "less
favorable" includes an outcome that results in a severe collateral consequence
when it was reasonably likely that this could have been avoided through
"creative bargaining." The Supreme Court recently described such creative
bargaining in Vartelas v. Holder.6 ' Although the issue in the case was whether
relevant immigration law applied retroactively to the petitioner's conviction
(the Court held that it did not), the Court commented on the content of plea
negotiations that could have taken place: "Armed with knowledge that a guilty
plea would preclude travel abroad, aliens like Vartelas might endeavor to
negotiate a plea to a nonexcludable offense-in Vartelas' case, e.g., possession
of counterfeit securities .... In a decision that directly addressed bargaining
duties, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently found deficient
attorney performance where counsel failed to seek a disposition that would
have avoided the deportation consequences of the defendant's conviction. In
other words, the court held there was a right to effective plea bargaining
counsel.
64. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
65. Id.
66. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.
67- 132 S. Ct. 1479 (2012).
68. Id. at 1492 n.1o (2012).
6g. Commonwealth v. Marinho, 464 Mass. 115 (2013). Although the court relied on state
constitutional standards governing ineffective assistance of counsel, it cited Padilla, Frye,
and Lafler in support of its deficient representation holding. Id. at 124-27. Ultimately, the
court held that Marinho failed to prove prejudice. Id. at 129-32.
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The Court has long denied any constitutional right to a plea bargain.70
However, if negotiations take place, and there is a right to counsel at this
critical stage, then it logically follows that there is a right to effective
bargaining counsel. As Lafler analogized, although the "Constitution does not
require States to provide a system of appellate review at all," if the State "opts
to act" in that field, "it must nonetheless act in accordance with the dictates of
the Constitution."7 ' Applied to a potential plea bargaining duty, this approach
means that when the prosecutor opts to bargain, defense counsel has a
constitutional duty to meet minimum Sixth Amendment standards.'
Neither lack of a constitutional right to a bargain nor a duty to act
effectively when bargaining answers the more difficult question of whether
counsel must affirmatively make reasonable efforts to secure a favorable plea
offer. In other words, if the prosecutor does not make an offer, must defense
counsel take steps to explore the alternatives? It is difficult to conceive of
counsel's role, particularly in a system where so many cases are resolved
through bargaining, that does not include such a duty. The Court has pointed
out that the necessity of and practical purposes served by plea bargaining
"presuppose fairness in securing agreement between an accused and a
prosecutor."' Allowing counsel to function ineffectively in bargaining as a
constitutional matter cuts against notions of fairness, and against an
70. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1395 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is no
constitutional right to plea bargain; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to
go to trial." (quoting Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977))); cf ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
5 3-4.1(a) (3d ed. 1993), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dan/aba/publications/crininaljustice-standards/prosecution defensefunction.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE STANDARDS] ("The prosecutor should have and make known a
general policy or willingness to consult with defense counsel concerning disposition of
charges by plea."); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY 5 14-3.1 cmt. 2
( 3d ed. 1999), http://www.americanbar.org/contentdanm/aba/publications/criminal-justice
standards/pleasguilty.authcheckdam.pdf (stating that "a refusal to negotiate with
defendants is inconsistent with the ABA's Prosecution Function Standards and with efficient
judicial administration" (citing ABA PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra, § 3-4.1(a))).
71. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
72. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387 (citations omitted) (quoting Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401
(1985)).
73. Meeting this constitutional floor does not necessarily mean counsel has met professional or
ethical duties related to plea bargaining, which may well require more rigorous
representation. For example, many professional standards required counsel to advise clients
about the deportation consequences of a conviction long before Padilla found a Sixth
Amendment duty to so advise. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482-83 (2010).
74. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
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underlying theme that the bargaining market is free and balanced enough to be
an acceptable manner of resolving criminal cases. Further, the lack of a right to
have the prosecution make an offer or even engage in plea bargaining
underscores the need for defense counsel who is effective at getting the
prosecution to the bargaining table when such action is consistent with the
client's goals and who is effective in representing the defendant in actual
negotiations.
To be sure, the right to effective plea bargaining counsel cannot be based
on counsel's ability to secure an actual offer, since the prosecution can refuse a
particular proposal from defense counsel and can even refuse to bargain at all
in any given case. Rather, the right to effective bargaining should be judged-
as other effective assistance claims under Strickland's first prong are judged7 -
by counsel's success or failure in following prevailing professional norms
relating to plea negotiations.
C. Prevailing Professional and Ethical Norms on Plea Bargaining
There is an ongoing interaction between the constitutional right to counsel
and the other sources that regulate defense counsel's behavior, including
professional standards, ethical rules, and informal mechanisms such as
common practice. Indeed, constitutional norms incorporate these other
regulatory sources by requiring litigants claiming ineffective assistance to
demonstrate that counsel's failures violated prevailing professional norms. For
example, in Wiggins v. Smith the Court looked to "standard practice in
Maryland in capital cases at the time of Wiggins' trial," to the ABA Guidelines
for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, and
to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice to analyze the claim that counsel's
failure to investigate mitigating evidence for Wiggins' capital sentencing
hearing was unconstitutionally unreasonable.
There is also an ongoing interaction between the Court's articulation of
ineffective assistance norms and defense counsel practice. For example, after
the Court held in favor of Wiggins, the defense community responded with a
spate of capital mitigation trainings77 A similar dialogue took place before and
75. See supra note 7 (discussing Strickland's test for ineffective assistance claims).
76. 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) ("Counsel's conduct . . . fell short of the standards for capital
defense work articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA) -standards to which we
long have referred as 'guides to determining what is reasonable.'" (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984))).
77. See Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty To Investigate,
and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1116 n.97 (2004)
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after the Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky. Before Padilla, a number of
professional standards, practice manuals, and other sources recommended that
defense counsel advise clients about immigration consequences.78 After Padilla
cited those sources in articulating a constitutional duty to advise about
deportation, the defense bar, prosecutors, and judges worked to conform to the
decision, and professional organizations immediately began to consider
changes to their standards. 7 9  These dynamic interactions between
constitutional norms and everyday practice demonstrate the relevance of
prevailing professional norms of plea bargaining in determining whether and
how to define constitutionally effective plea bargaining counsel. The existence
of a variety of professional standards relating to plea bargaining also suggests
that, like the Court's regulation of capital mitigation in Wiggins, defining the
right to counsel to encompass effective bargaining counsel is neither unrealistic
nor impossible to achieve.so
The content of these nonconstitutional sources on plea bargaining vary
widely, but all support a duty to bargain as a core defense function. For
example, the ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice- standards the Supreme
Court often cites in ineffective assistance decisions8, -have a section entitled
(noting the capital defense bar's "swift" reaction to Wiggins and citing various mitigation
trainings).
78. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482-83 (citing professional standards, practice manuals, defense
bar publications, treatises, and scholarly publications in support of holding that "[t]he
weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her
client regarding the risk of deportation").
79. See, e.g., The Fifth National Training on the Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions,
DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS PARTNERSHIP, http://defendingimmigrants.org/trainings/item
.2587-The FifthNational_Training ontheImmigrationConsequences ofCriminalCon
(last visited Feb. 28, 2013) ("This intensive, two-day, tuition-free national training will
provide defenders with the tools necessary to comply with Padilla, strategies to mitigate
immigration consequences and methods to institutionalize Padilla advisal in your defender
office."); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-5.4(c) (Reporter's Draft 2013) [hereinafter ABA DRAFT
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE STANDARDS] (proposing to amend the standards to recommend
consideration of collateral consequences in negotiations).
So. Cf Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1413 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting "the
necessity of confronting the serious difficulties that will be created by constitutionalization
of the plea-bargaining process"). The ability to define the right is a good start, but does not
ensure that defendants will actually receive effective representation. See Stephen B. Bright,
Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lauyer, 103
YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
s. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387
(2005); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524.
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"Duty to Explore Disposition Without Trial."" Although the standard states
only that "[d]efense counsel may engage in plea discussions with the
prosecutor,"" the commentary describes such discussions as a "significant part
of the duty of defense counsel" that "should be considered the norm, and
failure to seek such discussions an exception."8 * The nonmandatory language
accounts for limited circumstances where a defendant might forgo negotiations
for strategic reasons. For example, counsel might advise a client to enter an
early guilty plea to the full set of charges in order to foreclose subsequent
additional charges on the same set of facts, based on information that opening
the case up for plea negotiations might reveal. Or a defendant might instruct
counsel that he wants his day in court and will not plead guilty under any
circumstances."s
The National Legal Aid and Defender Association's Performance
Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation offer detailed guidance on
"The Contents of the Negotiations."8 This guideline covers developing a
negotiation plan and strategy and conducting negotiations. Developing the
plan calls for awareness of, among other things, the "consequences of
conviction such as deportation, and civil disabilities," any "likely sentence
enhancements or parole consequences," "the possible and likely place and
manner of confinement," and "the effect of good-time credits on the sentence
of the client."8' Strategic considerations call for counsel to be "completely
familiar" with "concessions that the client might offer" and "benefits the client
might obtain," including: giving up the right to litigate a pretrial motion;
82. ABA PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 70, § 4-6.1 (stating also that
"defense counsel should explore the possibility of an early diversion of the case from the
criminal process through the use of other community agencies").
83. Id. S 4 -6.i(b) (emphasis added).
84. Id. § 4-6.1, cmt. A pending draft of the ABA Defense Function Standards revisions makes
the duty to bargain, at least for the purpose of avoiding collateral consequences, explicit:
"Defense counsel should include consideration of potential collateral consequences in
negotiations with the prosecutor regarding disposition and sentence." ABA PROSECUTION
AND DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 79, § 4-54(c).
85. Cf Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel
where a lawyer failed to counsel the defendant "that, although he never even suggested such
a thought to [his client], it was [defense counsel's] own view that his client's decision to
reject the plea bargain was suicidal").
86. NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE
REPRESENTATION § 6.2 (2011); see also id. (noting, in a section entitled "The Plea
Negotiation Process and the Duties of Counsel," how "[clounsel should explore with the
client the possibility and desirability of reaching a negotiated disposition of the charges
rather than proceeding to a trial").
87. Id. 5 6.2(a).
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cooperation in a law enforcement investigation; lack of opposition to bail
pending sentence or appeal; the ability to enter a conditional plea, preserving
the right to appeal certain issues; and "specific benefits concerning the
accused's place and/or manner of confinement."88 Significantly, the guideline
calls for familiarity with local custom: "[C]ounsel should attempt to become
familiar with the practices and policies of the particular jurisdiction, judge and
prosecuting authority which may affect the content and likely results of
negotiated plea bargains."9' Anthony Amsterdam's Trial Manual for the Defense
of Criminal Cases offers similarly detailed guidance for plea negotiations.90
Local standards may also provide guidance in particular jurisdictions, or
demonstrate consensus among jurisdictions. For example, a Massachusetts
defender manual states that counsel's plea discussions should include
"advocating for language most favorable to the client" in the proffer the
prosecution will offer as factual support for the guilty plea.9 1 Washington state
defender standards describe counsel's "obligation to pursue with the
prosecutor and the court 'immigration-safe' dispositions."" They also note
that, for persistent felony offender representation, "[b]ecause the goal . . . is
often settlement, rather than trial, counsel should prepare challenges to each
potential 'strike' before the settlement negotiations."93
When a client wishes to plead guilty, or when there is a strong likelihood of
conviction after trial, it is difficult to imagine effective representation that does
not include affirmatively seeking the best plea bargain possible given the
circumstances of the case and defendant. This is particularly true in a criminal
justice system that punishes many individuals convicted after trial much more
harshly than those convicted after a guilty plea, in what has been characterized
as a "trial tax."94 Professional standards offer counsel significant guidance for
undertaking negotiation. They also give potential petitioners - and courts -
88. Id. § 6.2(b).
89. Id. § 6.2(d).
go. ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, 1 TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES §§ 201-219
(5th ed. 1988).
gi. Assigned Counsel Manual, supra note 56, at 14.
92. Standards for Public Defense Services, WASH. DEFENDER AsS'N 17 (20o6),
http://www.defensenet.org/resources/publications-i/wda-standards-for-indigent-defense.
93. Id. at 24-25 ("Coming to the negotiation table with as much mitigating evidence as possible
is, therefore of paramount importance for persistent offender clients.").
94. Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1158 (2008); see also William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 531 (2001)
(discussing how "[r]aising the threatened sentence ... increases the threat value of trial,
which in turn increases the incentive for the defendant to plead guilty").
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significant guidance against which to judge any claim of ineffective bargaining
assistance. Indeed, these standards appear to establish the type of "prevailing
professional norms" that would support a Sixth Amendment duty to undertake
and effectively carry out plea bargaining.
II. OBSTACLES AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN DEFINING
EFFECTIVE PLEA BARGAINING COUNSEL
A right to effective plea bargaining counsel remains unsettled and
controversial. 95 The Court has yet to take up the issue directly,96 and scholars
have just begun to address regulation of the content of plea negotiations."
This Part discusses two main obstacles to the development of the right to
effective bargaining counsel: the Court's characterization of plea bargaining as
an "art" taking place behind closed doors, and thus difficult to review; and the
oft-repeated argument that any extension of effective assistance rights will
open the floodgates to litigants seeking to reverse convictions, even if the
conviction flows from a bargained-for plea.
A. Plea Bargaining as an Art Conducted Behind Closed Doors
Although Fye and Lafler centered on the right to counsel during plea
bargaining and counseling, neither case required the Court to "define the duty
95. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and the Subtle Art of Winning by Losing, 25 FED. SENT'G
REP. 41 (2012) ("It remains to be seen whether the Court in Lafler similarly has obliged a
defense attorney to push (and how hard?) a defendant to accept a plea bargain (or, for that
matter, to push a prosecutor to offer one).").
96. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1412 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (" [N]either the State nor
the Solicitor General argued that counsel's performance here was adequate.... In other
cases, however, it will not be so clear that counsel's plea-bargaining skills, which must now
meet a constitutional minimum, are adequate.").
97. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Peeking Behind the Plea Bargaining Process, 46 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2013), http://ssm.com/abstract=2188077 ("Frye and Lafler establish that a
defendant has the right to effective assistance during plea bargaining, but the Court did not
firmly establish the minimum standards that will satisfy this right."); Jane Campbell
Moriarty & Marisa Main, "Waiving" Goodbye to Rights: Plea Bargaining and the Defense
Dilemma of Competent Representation, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 1029, 1042 (2011) (noting,
even before the Court decided Frye and Lafler, how a "criminal defense attorney . .. may
even have a duty to seek out plea negotiations with the prosecution").
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and responsibilities of defense counsel in the plea bargain process."', Indeed,
the Court noted that defining effective bargaining "is a difficult question":
"The art of negotiation is at least as nuanced as the art of trial advocacy
and it presents questions farther removed from immediate judicial
supervision." Bargaining is, by its nature, defined to a substantial
degree by personal style. The alternative courses and tactics in
negotiation are so individual that it may be neither prudent nor
practicable to try to elaborate or define detailed standards for the
proper discharge of defense counsel's participation in the process.99
Yet, as explored in the preceding Part, effective plea bargaining is not immune
to definition or analysis; standards can articulate factors counsel should
consider in formulating a negotiation plan and strategy and in actual
negotiations. There is also a significant literature on effective negotiation
strategies, including in the specific realm of plea bargaining in criminal
cases.
Further, characterizing a lawyering skill as an "art" has not previously
stopped the Court from regulating counsel's behavior as a constitutional
matter. Describing capital sentencing representation as "sufficiently like a trial
in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decision,"o1 the
Court also stated: "Representation is an art, and an act or omission that is
unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another.""o2 The
Court's response to this problem of evaluation was threefold. First, evaluating
counsel's performance with reference to prevailing professional norms offered
a comparative reference point. Second, requiring defendants to demonstrate
prejudice meant that even unreasonable errors would not disturb an outcome
unless those errors "actually had an adverse effect on the defense."o 3 Third, ex
post evaluation of counsel's behavior must be viewed with heavy deference,
and the burden is on defendants to overcome a presumption of strategic rather
g8. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) ("This case presents neither the necessity nor
the occasion to define the duties of defense counsel in those respects, however.").
99. Id. at 1408 (quoting Preno v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741 (2011)).
1oo. See, e.g., Dan Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New
Insights from Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. DisP. REs. 597 (20o6); Rodney J. Uphoff, The
Criminal Defense Lauyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINIcAL L. REV. 73
(1995).
101. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
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than inadequate representation.10 4 All of these ways to mitigate difficulties of
regulating the "art" of trial advocacy apply equally to plea bargaining. To be
sure, these three responses to evaluative obstacles have made relief from
ineffective assistance generally inaccessible to individual litigants, and
Strickland and its progeny are deserving of the well-developed body of
scholarly critique about the hurdles the doctrine has constructed."os However,
plea bargaining jurisprudence -like capital mitigation effectiveness
jurisprudence before it"'-serves an important signaling function that can
help shape criminal law practitioners' behavior ex ante even where it fails at
individual ex post facto regulation.
Although full exploration of the ways in which judicial pronouncements
might define and thus shape effective plea bargaining counsel is beyond this
Essay's scope, there are several obvious candidates for regulation: failure to
seek discovery and to investigate prior to bargaining (which would allow
analysis of the egregious practices common in the lower criminal courts,
including guilty pleas entered at arraignment after little consultation between
client and counsel and little effort at negotiation tailored to the particular client
and case);'o, failure to gain knowledge of likely trial outcomes and plea
discounts as baselines for negotiation that are then individually tailored; and
failure to seek to avoid unnecessary and severe collateral consequences in
appropriate cases. os Further, although the Court rejected a checklist approach
to the analysis of ineffective assistance claims in the trial context,' 09 this type of
structured evaluation might be appropriate in analyses of plea bargaining.
A more powerful critique of regulating the plea bargaining process is that
because bargaining happens off the record between prosecution and defense-
and normally outside the defendant's presence -it is difficult to adequately
examine any later claim of ineffectiveness in that process."o Yet plea
104. Id. at 688-90.
105. See, e.g., Bright, supra note 80.
106. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
107. See Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution, 32 FORD.
URB. L.J. 315, 331 n.86 ("Pleas at arraignments fly directly in the face of the lawyer's
constitutional and ethical duty to investigate."); Annual Report 2011, CRIM. CT. OF THE CITY
OF N.Y. 29 (2on1), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/nyc/criminal/AnnualReport2o1.pdf
(reporting that almost half of all New York City misdemeanors are resolved at
arraignment).
io8. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
log. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
110. See Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 745 (2on1) ("A trial provides the full written record and
factual background that serve to limit and clarify some of the choices counsel made. . . . The
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negotiations are not the only facet of criminal defense practice lacking in
transparency. Investigations, witness interviews, and other pretrial events
happen outside the courtroom and are not usually recorded. Although a later
trial might highlight counsel's failures at such tasks, most postconviction
proceedings exploring alleged pretrial ineffective assistance would rely heavily
on the testimony of counsel and the defendant. Testimony about plea
negotiations is no different. This is particularly true because counsel is required
to communicate plea offers and discuss negotiation outcomes with the client,1"
meaning that plea discussions will be part of the already regulated conversation
between the defendant and counsel."' In addition, there are ways to document
plea negotiations, including criminal procedure rules requiring offers to be in
writing and a practice of putting offers on the record."3 Just as judges have a
post-Padilla incentive to inquire whether counsel advised about immigration
consequences, they have a post-Frye and -Lafler incentive to explore whether
and how counsel engaged in plea negotiations.114
Although it may be hard to regulate plea bargaining, courts have deep
institutional competence regulating the activities of actors in the judicial
system."' The alternative -throwing up one's hands at the difficulty of the
task-would essentially result in abdicating responsibility for enforcement of a
constitutional right.
added uncertainty that results when there is no extended, formal record and no actual
history to show how the charges have played out at trial works against the party alleging
inadequate assistance."). Even in Premo, a decision that demonstrates great reluctance to
regulate plea bargaining, the Court analyzed the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance
relating to the plea process under its right to counsel precedents. Id. at 746 ("The substantial
burden to show ineffective assistance of counsel, the burden the claimant must meet to
avoid the plea, has not been met in this case.").
iii. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (imposing a duty to communicate offers
and discussing professional standards requiring prompt communication and consultation).
112. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
113. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409 ("[T]the fact of a formal offer means that its terms and its processing
can be documented so that what took place in the negotiation process becomes more clear if
some later inquiry turns on the conduct of earlier pretrial negotiations.").
114. Such judicial inquiry will be constrained in jurisdictions with rules barring judicial
participating in plea negotiations. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. ii(c)(1). But see VT. R. CluM. P.
11(e)(1) (allowing judicial participation in plea negotiations if proceedings are recorded);
Gibson v. Georgia, 636 S.E.2d 767, 769 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that, notwithstanding
a court rule barring judicial participation in plea discussions, such participation is allowed so
long as it does not become "so great as to render the plea involuntary").
115. See Josh Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 1133 (2013) (describing plea
bargaining law as "extralegal," but noting disagreement with the notion "that plea-
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B. The "Floodgates" Objection to Ineffective Assistance Norms
A common refrain in ineffective assistance cases is that granting the
defendant's claim will open the floodgates to future litigation."6  This
argument is emphasized when it comes to the guilty plea process, as the
number of potential litigants is so enormous."
There are a number of reasons a right to effective plea counsel will not open
the floodgates. First, most defendants who plead guilty do not later challenge
that plea, in part because they received a benefit from the bargain. Often, they
are long released from any incarceration by the time any ineffective assistance
claim would be heard, severely undercutting any incentive to pursue a claim."
Second, those considering claims face significant hurdles in overcoming the
presumption that counsel acted strategically (and thus competently) and in
proving prejudice. 19 The latter requires demonstrating a reasonable likelihood
that, absent deficient bargaining, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different -an extremely difficult task.' Third, as Padilla recently noted,
fears of floodgates have not historically been borne out.'
CONCLUSION
Gideon's Supreme Court victory was not a foregone conclusion. Indeed,
Gideon reversed a decision of only twenty-one years earlier denying a federal
constitutional right to counsel in state court."' Frye and Lafler have already
caused much debate, beginning with Justice Scalia's stinging dissents accusing
116. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484 (2010) ("We confronted a similar 'floodgates'
concern in Hill . . . ."); cf Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of
Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 697, 736-41 (2oo2)
(critiquing the floodgates objection).
117. Brief of Respondent at 35-36, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. o8-651), 2009 WL 2473880, at
*35-36.
uis. The exception is claims relating to severe collateral consequences, where the defendant will
continue to suffer the consequences of the conviction long after the penal sentence ends.
119. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Marinho, 464 Mass. 11S, 128-32 (2013) (holding that counsel
ineffectively bargained but that the defendant failed to prove prejudice).
121. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484-85 ("We have given serious consideration to ... the importance of
protecting the finality of convictions obtained through guilty pleas. We confronted a similar
'floodgates' concern in Hill, but nevertheless applied Strickland to a claim that counsel had
failed to advise the client regarding his parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty. A flood did
not follow in that decision's wake." (citation omitted)).
122. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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the Court of "embrac[ing] the sporting-chance theory of criminal law, in
which the State functions like a conscientious casino-operator, giving each
player a fair chance to beat the house, that is, to serve less time than the law
says he deserves."" Yet as with Gideon, the overarching theme of the Court's
recent plea bargaining jurisprudence is the need for counsel-and the
unfairness of proceeding without effective counsel-in a complex criminal
justice system.
Trial convictions may lead to sentences that are technically what "the law
says [a defendant] deserves," but legislatures have ratcheted up potential
sentences so that bargaining now occurs against the backdrop of extreme
outcomes in the absence of a deal." As Lafler noted, counsel's incompetence
cost Lafler "a plea offer for a sentence the prosecution evidently deemed
consistent with the sound administration of criminal justice.""' Plea
bargaining is no sport, at least not for defendants. Rather, it is a serious event
that-depending on whether and how it is conducted-can result in a lifelong
mark of a criminal record and loss of liberty or even life.
In a plea bargaining system, what is the effective assistance of counsel if it
does not encompass effectiveness within the plea negotiation process? The
Court has started the difficult and nuanced process of regulating plea
bargaining, but much remains to be done to give true content to the meaning
of effective plea bargaining counsel.
123. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1398 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124. See Bowers, supra note 115 (manuscript at 32-33) ("[P]lea-bargaining-[is] a domain of
unique constitutional control.. . . [that] serves as a welcome counterweight to prosecutor's
almost unfettered charging discretion to set starting prices so very high."); Ronald F.
Wright, Trial Distortion and the End ofInnocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
79, 129 (2005) ("Changes in federal sentencing practices during the 198os and 1990s
increased the certainty and size of the penalty for going to trial, and mightily influenced the
guilty plea and acquittal rates during those times."); Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Sentencing Shift
Gives New Leverage to Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com
/2o11/o9/26/us/tough-sentences-help-prosecutors-push-for-plea-bargains.html ("In the
courtroom and during plea negotiations, the impact of these stricter [sentencing] laws is
exerted through what academics call the 'trial penalty.' The phrase refers to the fact that the
sentences for people who go to trial have grown harsher relative to sentences for those who
agree to a plea."); see also supra note 94 and accompanying text.
125. Laer, 132 S. Ct. at 1387 ("The favorable sentence ... appears to be the sentence [Lafler] or
others in his position would have received in the ordinary course, absent the failings of
counsel.").
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